篇章数

15

引证文献

0 !

参考文献

509

基础设施产业的政府监管图书

Government Regulation of Infrastructure ——Institutional Design and Capacity Building

SSAPID:101-5581-9070-29
ISBN:978-7-5097-1011-1
DOI:
ISSN:

[内容简介] 本书收录了一组有关网络型基础设施产业领域的政府监管体制的文章。这些文章分别从经济学、行政法学、政治学、公共政策的角度,讨论了网络型基础设施产业的技术经济特征、政府监管与市场竞争的关系,阐述了政府监管的经济逻辑、体制安排、监管程序、监管能力,并介绍了电信、电力、铁路领域产业结构改革与监管体制改革的国际经验,以及中国电力产业改革和监管体制建设的进展和问题。

相关信息

丛书名:
作 者: 余燕山
编 辑:叶灼新;孙振远
出版社:社会科学文献出版社
出版时间: 2010年02月
语 种:中文
中图分类:F0 经济学

 导论 市场扩张与政府监管改革*

  一 引言:市场经济与监管国家的兴起

  二 监管的本质与政府监管的地位

   1.监管的概念和本质

   2.公有企业、私有企业与政府监管

  三 美国作为一个监管国家的演进

   (一)美国作为一个监管国家的兴起

   (二)美国监管改革与最新进展

  四 其他发达国家监管体系的演进

   (一)英国的监管创新

   (二)新西兰监管改革实验的新动向

   (三)对东亚模式的冲击

  五 中国的监管改革:不一样的任务

   (一)监管改革在探索中起步

   (二)监管改革意义重大、任重道远

 第一章 基础设施产业政府监管的一般理论*

  一 政府监管的必要性

   1.政府监管的内涵

   2.自然垄断的内涵

    (1)自然垄断的概念与特征

    (2)自然垄断的条件

   3.政府监管的产生

   4.特许拍卖

   5.可竞争市场

   6.经济转型

   7.小结

  二 政府监管的目标

   1.监管的三重目标

   2.监管目标之间的关系

   3.小结

  三 监管制度的设计原则

   1.监管失灵

   2.监管机构的设计原则

    (1)监管机构的独立性

    (2)监管决策的分散化

  四 激励性监管

   1.激励性监管与有效定价

   2.激励性监管与价格上限监管

   3.激励监管面临的挑战

  五 监管与反垄断

   1.政府监管与反垄断机制的差异

    (1)控制权和控制程序

    (2)监控时间

    (3)信息结构

    (4)市场监管机构的独立性

   2.两类机制与基础设施产业监管

  六 产业重组

   1.产业重组的含义

   2.纵向重组的选择

   3.重组方案的分析

    (1)结构分离(第4和第5种方案)

    (2)竞争性接入

    (3)分离与竞争性接入方案的对比

   4.小结

 第二章 竞争、信息与发展Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1998,Washington,D. C.:World Bank,pp.237-257. 该论文的中文版翻译和使用得到世界银行出版部授权,并最先在2001年国务院体改办举办的“中国电力行业监管国际研讨会”上使用。原文是世界银行发展经济学1998年年会关于竞争与监管的主题发言之一。">*

  一 引言

  二 低效的税务系统

   交叉补贴的作用

   另外一种方法

  三 缺乏监督、审计、实施政策的专业技能

   对于信息问题的委托—代理方法

   竞争增强的作用

  四 有限的科技知识

  五 广泛的腐败

  六 失效的信用市场

  七 政府缺乏承诺能力

  八 有私人目标的政府

  九 结论

  附录一 对于《竞争、信息和发展》的评论(之一)

   失效的税收征管系统和高成本的公共基金

   传统竞争政策

   信用市场

   信誉度和政府

  附录二 对于《竞争、信息和发展》的评论(之二)

   透明度和上层建筑的惯性

   信息、技术和决断力

   竞争政策

   腐败,责任和获利

   信用市场

   结论

 第三章 监管问题的解决框架Regulation Institution and Commitment:Comparative Studies of Telecommunications)一书中的第一章(Brian Levy & Pablo T.Spilelr(1996)“A Framework for Resolving the Regulatory Problem Competition,” in Brain Levy and Pablo T.Spiler eds.(1996)Regulations,Institutions,and Commitment:Comparative Studies of Telecommunicatios,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,pp.1-35)。该文最早的中文译本出现在由肖梦选择并编辑,刊载于《产业论坛》1999年第6期的一组关于电信业监管的文章中。该文的节译刊登在《社会经济体制比较》1999年第3期。该论文的中文版翻译和使用获得作者的授权,并在2001年国务院体改办主办的“中国电力行业监管国际研讨会”上作为背景文献使用。感谢肖梦提供《产业论坛》所使用的、中央编译局当代所罗燕明的译文(中国人民大学,2007级研究生赵越补充了文中所涉及的参考文献)。">*

  一 引言

  二 分析框架

   监管问题的解决:经验分析框架

   监管设计中的治理和激励

   制度禀赋和监管治理

   制度禀赋和监管激励

   决策树

  三 国家案例的制度背景

   传统议会制:牙买加和英国

   原型总统制:智利

   寻租主导制:阿根廷和菲律宾

  四 监管体制和效率

   竞争

   价格监管

  五 制度禀赋和监管承诺

   传统议会制:牙买加和英国

   高投资的制度基础

   监管治理的差别

   监管激励的差别

   监管的不相称:牙买加(1966~1975年)

   原型总统制:智利

   监管治理的弱点

   监管重组

   寻租主导的体制:阿根廷和菲律宾

   监管治理问题

   面对困境的投资

  六 某些未尽问题

 第四章 加强能力建设,确保监管质量*

  一 引言

  二 监管政策:背景与重要性

   监管政策对实现公共政策目标的贡献

   在高质量监管的帮助下实现特定政策目标

   政策目标:清晰、复杂、重叠与权衡

   监管政策与更宽泛的治理框架之间的联系

   应对不同治理体制可能提出的挑战

  三 旨在提高监管质量的能力建设:OECD国家的现状如何

   监管政策

   监管机构

   旨在提升监管质量的集中监督机构:可能是必需的,但往往难以建立

   集中性的政府机构:正确认识其前景与贡献

   独立监管者:有助于提高透明度和促进市场竞争

   竞争主管机构:它们在监管质量议程中仍然扮演着关键角色

   地方政府:日益重要但与监管质量议程之间的关系还有待完善

   国际因素:一个日益重要的问题,不仅存在于国际贸易领域

   监管手段

   行政简化

   监管影响分析和有效的事前评估

   透明度与咨询

   替代监管的措施

   遵守与强制执行

   行政正义和可问责性

   监管绩效

   更好地理解监管质量过程和实际监管绩效之间的关联

   吸取教训,总结经验

  四 实际运用高质量监管:进展与挑战

   国别审查所涵盖的现有议程仍有一段路要走

   现有政策目标的贯彻:“进展”情况不一

   一个新出现的挑战:公共部门

   在已引入竞争、国家仍是重要所有人的公共服务领域,需要谨慎行事

   将监管质量运用于地方公共服务问题需要特别关注

  五 鼓励为政策制定和政策目标设定更有效的监管框架

   推动行政机构的文化变革

   采用用户友好性更强的方式是基本出发点

   但这只是个开端:需要进行更深入的改革以确立监管质量及其重要性的文化意识

   更注重从经济角度考虑问题

   建立文化变革议程与更广泛的公共部门治理变革议程之间的联系

   采取具体措施推广新文化

   加强沟通,让利益相关者参与其中

   应对既得利益者

   跨越政治周期

   与利益相关者合作

   正确对待赢家和输家

  六 结论:更新行动计划

 第五章 监管型国家:英国与德国的比较*

  一 概要

  二 引言

   政治经济学和监管中的国家传统

   体现国家传统的经济秩序:资本主义模式

   行政传统和监管风格

   国家传统的局限

   英国的“新型监管国家”

   国家和市场的关系

   国家的内部重构:独立的监管机构

   新工党执政下新型监管国家的巩固

   趋同、分化与监管型国家:什么,如何和为何

   什么是趋同?趋同标准

   趋同是怎么发生的?政策学习方法

   为什么会出现趋同?部门特色VS国家传统

   研究方法和工作规划

  三 电信业:趋同案例

   英国的“监管实验”和德国的跟进

   德国采用英国监管手段:市场环境的重要性

   英德对比:行政传统和监管风格的连续性

  四 电力行业:分化案例

   英国和德国的背景与改革:结构问题

   新竞争秩序下不同的监管工具

   新竞争秩序下不同的监管机构和决策程序

   德国例外论:对德国方式的另一种解释

  五 银行业:全球化案例

   德国和英国的银行业结构和监管传统

   趋同的外部原因:全球化和巴塞尔进程

   共同的监管工具:迈向二阶监管(second-order regulation)

   共同的监管机构:金融服务主管机构的合并

   趋向于一种新的监管模式

  六 结论:持续的多样化

   什么是趋同,什么是分化

    监管机构

    监管工具

    监管的法律条文化和司法主宰化

    消费者保护

   趋同如何发生的?通过政策学习实现了政策转移

   解释趋同与分化:部门力量VS国家传统

   结论性评述:趋同、分化与监管国家的未来

 第六章 改革基础产业:民营化、监管与竞争*

  一 近几十年来,基础产业的融资和供给出现了新的模式

  二 迄今为止,效果如何

   对投资和服务扩展的影响

   对运营效率的影响

   对分配效率的影响

   对分配公平性的影响

  三 新的模式风险重重,但预期收益也将巨大

   分拆很难做好

   需要谨慎的监管

   民营化一直被高估和误解

   普适模式并不存在——没有最优,只有更优

  四 对发展中经济体和转型经济体而言,如何制定良好的监管机制是一个巨大的挑战

   怎样才能形成有效的监管制度?

   如何才能各就其位?

  五 有效的监管如何才能改善投资环境

   在承诺与弹性之间平衡

   正确运用经济学原理

  六 一份行动日程表

 第七章 发展中国家基础设施部门改革的监管重点Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1998,Washington,D. C.:World Bank,pp.191-223. 该论文的中文版翻译和使用得到世界银行出版部授权,并首先在2001年国务院体改办主办的“中国电力行业监管国际研讨会”上作为背景文献使用,其部分内容曾收录于课题组正式出版的研究报告集《中国基础设施产业政府监管体制改革研究报告》(中国财政经济出版社,2002)。">*

  一 引言

  二 受监管的基础设施部门的标准改革“处方”

  三 改革模式的选择

  四 对市场的竞争和市场中的竞争

  五 普遍服务、收入分配和监管课税

  六 监管机构的组织和程序

   法令框架

   监管机构的结构

   分行业与多行业监管机构

   单一监管官和多委员的结构及其任命

   监管的自由裁量权

   行政程序与司法复审

   监管机构人员和信息收集职权

  七 监管机制的设计

   固定价格机制

   秘鲁电信监管

   英格兰和威尔士配电公司的价格上限

   成本加成机制

   混合体系

  八 网络接入与竞争

  九 结论

  附录一 对保罗·L. 乔斯科文章的评论(一)

   印度电力产业改革

   印度电信产业改革

  附录二 对保罗·L. 乔斯科文章的评论(二)

   设计改革模式

   实施改革模式

   日本电信改革:失败例子的教训

 第八章 电信监管:制度结构和监管责任

  一 主要论点

  二 引言

   电信行业的独立监管机构

   一般性竞争管理机构在电信行业中的作用

   业务融合与监管结构

  三 电信监管机构的形式

  四 独立监管机构的行政管理结构

   汇报程序

   资金来源

   监管机构首脑的聘用

   司法权限

  五 行业监管机构与一般竞争管理机构之间的关系

  六 电信行业监管职责的划分

   执照颁发

   互联互通

   频谱的管理

   号码的管理

   价格监管

   普遍服务

   服务质量

  七 电信行业的业务融合与监管机构

 第九章 发展中国家电力改革与监管*

  一 绪论

  二 私有部门参与发展中国家电力发展

  三 发展中国家的改革

   竞争与市场力量

   配电网络的激励性监管

   价格与补贴改革

   改革措施的顺序

  四 聚焦具体改革

   有缺陷的监管设计:巴西和加利福尼亚的危机

   可行性改革:玻利维亚和挪威的案例

   玻利维亚的资本化

  五 发展中国家电力改革所面临的特殊问题

   小型电力系统的改革

   脆弱的制度禀赋

   腐败与政治投机

   国际组织能起什么作用?

  六 结论

  附录

   1.阿根廷

   2.巴西

   3.智利

   4.哥伦比亚

   5.秘鲁

   6.玻利维亚

   7.萨尔瓦多

   8.巴拿马

   9.牙买加

   10.匈牙利

   11.波兰

   12.捷克共和国

   13.奥里萨邦(印度)

   14.巴基斯坦

   15.摩洛哥

   16.中国

   17.泰国

   18.马来西亚

   19.菲律宾

   20.印度尼西亚

 第十章 为公共利益而重构铁路监管*

  一 绪论

  二 铁路领域当前的公共政策问题Regulation)第11卷28~36页所发表的“Railroad Deregulation:Using Competition as a Guide”一文中找到。">*

   足够收入的适当标准

   监管问题

   成本分配问题

   完全分配成本机制无法产生有经济效率的价格

   长期边际成本和价格效率

   经济上有效率的定价

   基于需求的差别定价

   拉姆齐定价的效率和公平

   独立成本约束

   独立成本可避免不适当的过高价格

   有效率的定价不需要对整个价格结构进行监管控制

   可竞争性以及监管的范畴和结构

   铁路行业的纵向结构*

  三 纵向铁路结构的一般方案

   单一化铁路方案的分析

   重组的必要

   结构分拆的分析——方案4和5

   竞争接入方案的分析

   分拆与竞争性接入的比较

  四 结语

  附录A 技术和铁路成本结构

   A.1 固定成本和可变成本

   A.2 沉没成本

   A.3 规模经济和范围经济

   A.4 幅员经济与规模经济和密度经济的比较

   A.5 规模经济的经验证据

  附录B 铁路成本、收益与基础设施变化

   B.1 铁路成本和基础设施变量

   B.2 低密度线路和收益

 第十一章 新世纪中国电力工业发展与改革

  一 电力改革稳步推进

   (一)政企分开、厂网分开基本实现,电力产业组织结构发生了有利于竞争的深刻变化

   (二)电力国企改革取得积极进展,促进了行业发展,提高了企业生产效率

   (三)电力市场建设稳步推进,努力探索建立市场配置电力资源的有效机制

   (四)电力管理体制改革有了新的突破,实现了政府管理体制和管理方式的创新

   (五)电力价格、投资改革稳步推进,电力法规建设取得积极进展

   (六)妥善解决厂网分开遗留问题,不断深化改革

  二 电力基本建设持续加快

   电力投资

  三 电源基本建设

   (一)电力装机容量快速增长

   (二)电源结构不断优化

    1.火电结构优化

    2.水电和核电建设加快

    3.风力发电取得突破性进展

  四 电网基本建设

   (一)电网建设速度加快

   (二)全国联网工程取得重要进展

   (三)“西电东送”三大输电通道基本形成

   (四)电网优化资源配置的作用日益显著

  五 电力工程造价与定额

   (一)电力工程造价

    1.发电工程

    2.送变电工程

   (二)电力行业定额

  六 电力供需形势逐步好转

   (一)电力生产情况

    1.发电量

    2.发电设备平均利用小时数

    3.发电燃料供应

   (二)电力供应情况

  七 电力消费

   (一)全社会用电量及其分类

   (二)电力消费弹性系数

  八 电力安全生产和可靠性进一步加强

   1.电力安全生产

   2.电力可靠性

   (一)发电机组可靠性

    1.火电机组运行可靠性指标

    2.水电机组运行可靠性指标

   (二)输变电设施可靠性

   (三)供电可靠性

  九 电价管理逐步规范

   (一)电价改革

    1.制定《电价改革方案》及其配套实施办法

    2.促进上网电价改革

    3.调整销售电价分类结构

    4.规范管理可再生能源发电价格和费用分摊

    5.规范跨地区交易电价

    6.推进城乡用电同价

    7.及时调整优惠电价政策

    8.推行分时电价制度

    9.对高耗能企业实行差别电价政策

    10.实行煤电价格联动

   (二)电价水平

    1.上网电价水平(见表11-15、表11-16)

    2.输配电价水平

    3.销售电价水平(见表11-18)

  十 电力环境保护和资源节约明显加强

   1.常规大气污染物排放与控制

    (1)烟尘

    (2)二氧化硫

    (3)氮氧化物

   2.火电厂废水排放与控制

   3.固体废气物排放与综合利用

    (1)粉煤灰

    (2)资源节约

   1.供电煤耗

   2.输电线损

  十一 电力科技实现新跨越

   (一)发电科技成果

    1.火电技术在高参数、大容量、高效率、环保型、节水型方面取得突破

    2.大力开发水电,以大型水电站和抽水蓄能电站为重点,因地制宜开发小水电

    3.核电技术实行引进消化与自主创新并举,核电安全水平不断提高

    4.可再生能源发电迅速发展,风电和太阳能突出

   (二)电网科技成果

    1.开展特高压交直流技术研究和应用

    2.加强提高电网输电能力的技术研究和应用

   (三)电力工程设计技术成果

  十二 电力企业生产经营得到好转

   (一)电网企业生产经营情况

    1.国家电网公司

    2.中国南方电网公司

   (二)五大发电集团生产经营情况

    1.华能集团公司

    2.大唐集团公司

    3.华电集团公司

    4.国电集团公司

    5.中电投集团公司

 第十二章 健全与社会主义市场经济相适应的电力管理体制研究*

  一 电力行业的特征与政府电力管理职能

   电力行业的基本特征

    技术经济特性

    市场需求特征

     (1)电力产品缺乏替代性,短期需求价格弹性具有刚性

     (2)电力需求与经济增长同周期,长期波动具有不确定性

     (3)电力个体需求具有间歇性和随机性特点,但一个地区的总体需求在短期内具有可预测性

     (4)电力需求具有普遍性

   电力管理职能

   传统的电力管理职能

   市场化条件下的电力管理职能

  二 国外政府电力管理体制

   美国电力管理体制

   英国电力管理体制

   日本电力管理体制

  三 我国现行电力管理体制及其存在的主要问题

   我国电力管理体制的历史沿革

    计划经济管理时期的电力管理体制(1949~1982年)

     (1)成立燃料工业部(1949~1955年)

     (2)成立电力工业部(1955~1958年)

     (3)成立水利电力部(1958~1966年)

     (4)“文化大革命”时期

     (5)第二次成立电力工业部(1979~1982年)

    改革探索时期的电力管理体制(1982~1997年)

     (1)第二次成立水利电力部(1982~1988年)

     (2)成立能源部(1988~1993年)

    电力改革深化时期的电力管理体制(1993~2002年)

     (1)第三次成立电力工业部(1993~1998年)

     (2)国家经贸委时期(1998~2002年)

   2002年以后的电力管理体制

   对历次电力管理体制改革的分析和评述

    历次电力管理体制改革简要评述

   传统电力管理体制的基本特征

   现行电力管理体制及其存在的主要问题

  四 健全与社会主义市场经济相适应的电力管理体制的政策建议

   总体思路

   基本原则

   具体设想

    第一种途径:保留现有电力管理机构格局,调整电力管理职责分工

    第二种途径:在大能源管理体制下,重构电力管理体制

     (1)政监合一模式

     (2)政监分离模式

     (3)政监适度分离模式

 第十三章 现代监管度下监管权的配置与监管程序问题

  一 监管权的配置问题

   政策部门与监管机构之间的权力配置

   监管机构之间的权力配置

   监管机构与反垄断机构之间的权力配置

    (1)监管机构作为主要的反垄断执法机构

    (2)废除产业监管机构,反垄断机构行使监管权力

    (3)建立反垄断机构与监管机构之间的合作机制

  二 监管程序问题

   监管机构可能面临的各种问题或风险

   过于独立可能会产生的不负责任问题

   程序过于僵化可能导致的低效率

   被监管对象捕获导致的独立性受到影响

   权力不足或者滥用权力导致的监管不力或者加大市场主体的交易成本

   缺乏透明度与公众参与所导致的合法性危机

   监管程序应该体现的原则

    1.独立性

    2.透明度

    3.公众参与

    4.职能分离

    5.效率

    6.多种监管形式的结合

    7.依法监管

    8.救济

 附录 OECD国家有关监管改革与监管治理的政策文件

  一 1995年OECD理事会关于改进政府监管质量的建议书及监管决策参考指南*

   前言

   OECD理事会(The Council)

   故有鉴于上述考量,并根据OECD公共管理委员会的建议,OECD理事会

   OECD监管决策参考指南

   “OECD监管决策参考指南”的背景注释

    Ⅰ.改进监管质量的必要性

    Ⅱ.使用上述指南以改进监管质量

    Ⅲ.OECD有关监管决策的指南

  二 1997年OECD关于监管改革的政策建议*

   建议一:在政府层面采用宽泛的监管改革计划,该计划应确立明确的目标和执行框架

   建议二:对监管进行系统地审查,确保它们有效地、高效地达到预期目标

   建议三:确保监管规则和监管程序的透明度和非歧视性,并保证监管和监管程序得到有效实施

   建议四:进行审查,必要时,扩大竞争政策的适用范围,并加强其执行效力和执行力度

   建议五:为促进竞争,应改革所有行业的经济监管,尽可能取消监管,除非有明确的证据表明监管是实现广大公众利益的最好方式

   建议六:达成国际间的协议,加强国际原则的实施,以消除贸易与投资上不必要的监管障碍

   建议七:明确监管改革与其他政策目标的重要关联,以便制定相关政策,在支持改革的同时也能实现其他这些目标的政策

  三 2005年OECD关于监管质量与监管绩效的指导原则*

   1997~2005年:监管政策的演进

   建议一:在政府层面上采用能够建立明确目标和执行框架的宽泛的监管改革

   建议二:系统地评估效果并评述监管政策,以确保它们能够在变化的、复杂的经济和社会环境中高效地、切实地实现预期目标

   建议三:确保监管规则、负责实施的监管机构以及监管程序的透明度和非歧视性

   建议四:评述并在必要情况下加强竞争政策的适用范围、有效性和执行力度

   建议五:在所有部门设计经济监管的目的都是促进竞争和提高效率,应尽可能废除监管,除非有明确的证据表明监管是实现大众利益的最好方式

   建议六:借助持续的自由化来消除贸易与投资上不必要的监管障碍,在整个监管过程中强化市场开放程度和更好的整合,因而提升经济效率和竞争力

   建议七:识别出同其他政策目标的重要关联之处,以能够支持改革的方式制定可以实现这些目标的政策

  四 2005年APEC-OECD关于监管改革的综合检查清单*

   1.国别行动计划和集体行动计划

   2.APEC-OECD有关监管改革的综合检查清单*

 前言与鸣谢

本书收录了一组有关网络型基础设施产业领域的政府监管体制的文章。这些文章分别从经济学、行政法学、政治学、公共政策的角度,讨论了网络型基础设施产业的技术经济特征、政府监管与市场竞争的关系,阐述了政府监管的经济逻辑、体制安排、监管程序、监管能力,介绍了电信、电力、铁路领域产业结构改革与监管体制改革的国际经验以及中国电力产业改革和监管体制建设的进展和问题。这些文章所关注的重点是基础设施领域政府监管的体制设计和能力建设问题,因为有效的政府监管将决定各国基础设施能否实现充分投资、加快发展和提高效率,从而影响一个国家的经济发展和社会公平。本书的内容,反映了现代市场经济中市场竞争与政府监管的一般关系,展示了完善市场经济的制度设计和政策改革的一般过程。

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