篇章数

12

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0 !

参考文献

117

强制披露与证券立法图书

Mandatory Disclosure and Securities Regulation

SSAPID:101-0620-5707-10
ISBN:7-80190-559-8
DOI:
ISSN:

[内容简介] 本书是一部系统介绍强制披露与自愿披露理论的著作,所收论文均为该领域最权威的经典作品。对于我们全面深刻地理解这场旷日持久的争论,具有十分重要的参考作用。

相关信息

丛书名:全球经济热点文丛
作 者:曹荣湘
编 辑:王静;吴安迪
出版社:社会科学文献出版社
出版时间: 2005年07月
语 种:中文
中图分类:E 军事

 编后记

 作者简介

 序二

 第一篇 信息披露的早期研究

  证券市场的公共管制*

   一 政策的制定

   二 对较早前管制的检验测试

   三 市场效率的衡量标准

   四 结论

   附录

  被要求的披露与股票市场:1934年证券交易法评估

   一 1934年证券交易法的披露要求

   二 披露的立法基础

   三 欺诈和操纵

   四 信息与投资者和投机者的理性决策

    1.发布财务数据的信息——财务说明书与股票价格

    2.财务数据资深用户的回报

   五 1934年法案对纽约股票交易所证券影响的实证分析

   六 股东的损失

   七 投资者对市场的信心——风险与公平

   八 总结与结论

  信息的私有价值、社会价值和发明活动的激励

   一 预知与发现的比较

   二 预知经济学要素

   三 纯交换经济中预知的价值

   四 预知的价值:生产与交换

   五 信息发布、公共信息和信念的同质性

   六 发现信息的价值

   七 专利政策的含义

   八 总结

  金融市场中的披露管制:现代金融理论与信号传递理论的意义

   一 引言

   二 完美信息的世界

   三 市场与信息

   四 激励—信号传递分析

    评价披露要求

    收益

    成本

   附录——选择性披露政策模型

    1.市场拥有完美信息,即信息是公共的

    2.没有披露,内部交易没有向市场传递信息

     没有内部交易

     允许内部交易

    3.没有披露法规,内部交易传送信息

    4.没有披露法规,但知道内部人的存在

    5.公司环境中的激励—信号传递方法

 第二篇 强制披露与自愿披露

  强制披露与投资者保护

   一 联邦政府对欺诈的禁止

    1.无法律干预的市场

    2.反欺诈法规的影响

    3.为什么反欺诈法规是国家的?

   二 强制披露

    1.披露与信息的公共物品属性

    2.披露的利己主义模型的局限性

    3.创造最优披露的私有或竞争方法

     1)信息中介

     2)知情交易者

     3)股票交易所

     4)州

    4.强制披露的一些微弱支持的理由

     1)增加市场的公众信心

     2)保护未成熟的投资者

     3)增加真实信息的供给

   三 针对第三方影响的披露法规、法律错误与寻租行为

    1.披露要求的目标

     1)控制第三方影响

     2)控制州间剥夺(exploitation)

     3)控制普通法过程的成本

    2.有效强制披露的轮廓

    3.强制披露要求的结构

     1)标准化的、惯例化的披露

     2)跨州公司披露但州内公司不披露

     3)注重历史事实

     4)禁止其他事实的披露或者已披露事实的口头“变化”

     5)事前评估与安全港

     6)严格使用重大遗漏检验

   四 关于成本与收益的证据

    1.直接成本

    2.间接成本:活跃水平的影响

    3.收益:投资者的利润

    4.收益:中介机构与公司的利润与损失

   五 结论

  市场失灵与强制披露制度的经济分析

   一 从公共物品的视角

    1.市场失灵:证券研究不足的一个原因

    2.社会资源的浪费与过度研究的问题

    3.配置数据:充足证券研究的社会利益研究

   二 自愿披露的理论

    1.对理论的批评

    2.实证比较

   三 向投资者的披露:有效市场中投资者导向的披露机制

    1.披露作为一种多元化投资的有效手段

    2.风险评估与组合投资修正

   四 结论

  民事责任和强制信息披露

   一 民事责任体系的适当目标

    (一)信息披露的社会收益

     1.信息披露对投资者保护并不重要

     2.信息披露在选择新投资项目和改进现有项目运营中的作用

      (1)立法机制

      (2)市场机制

     3.信息披露在增加二级市场的流动性中的作用

     4.结论

    (二)避免融资来源扭曲

   二 建议的民事责任体系

    (一)控制信息披露程序的实质性规则

     1.时间的顺序

     2.投资银行的认证

    (二)发行人的责任

     1.不发行证券时违背信息披露规则

     2.公开发行证券时所产生的信息披露违规

    (三)其他行为者的责任

     1.让非发行人的参与者承担责任的目的

     2.对“整体责任”有贡献义务的非发行人的行为者的责任

     3.赔偿金与发行人年总投资成比例的理论基础

     4.恢复的程序

    (四)打击性诉讼的潜力

   三 目前关于责任的一般讨论

    (一)规模和责任严格性的关系

    (二)非发行方行为者的责任的标准

    (三)私募发行(Private Placement)

   四 结论

  投资者成熟与自愿披露

   一 背景和模型的引入

   二 一种简单的公开定值竞拍

   三 对均衡披露的分析

   四 结论

   附录

   致谢

 第三篇 披露政策的比较分析

  强制披露与自愿披露:金融与实物外部性情形下的比较

   一 存在金融外部性的模型描述

   二 一个代表企业家与一个代表投资者的披露

    引论

   三 存在金融外部性的披露政策

   四 存在实物外部性时的披露政策

   五 结论

  强制披露与自愿披露的比较

   一 引言

   二 基本模型

   三 两种质量类型和外生的知情顾客数量

    1.自愿披露均衡

    2.均衡精炼

    3.知情顾客数量外生时的强制披露

   四 是否知情的决策

    1.产品价值与知情利益

    2.自愿披露的均衡

    3.知情顾客数量内生时的强制披露

   五 总结

   附录

  披露法律与收购报价*

   一 披露是私人最优的

   二 披露在收购报价中的作用

   三 结论

  强制披露的行为经济学分析*

   一 关于强制披露的争论

    1.基于公共物品的市场失灵观点

    2.基于外部性的市场失灵观点

    3.基于信息不对称的市场失灵观点

   二 思想实验

    1.羊群行为

    2.习惯与传统

    3.现状偏好

    4.社会范式

   三 从市场失灵到管制的思考

    1.存在资本市场失灵的证据吗?

    2.管制者能做得更好吗?

   四 结论

 强制披露与自愿披露:证券市场的信息问题(本书导读)

 序一

信息披露问题一直在西方受到髙度重视,特别是学术界有关“强制披露”与“自愿披露”的争论,持续了近半个世纪,至今也没有最终的结论。本书是国内第一部系统介绍强制披露与自愿披露理论的著作,所收论文均为该领域最杈威的经典作品。它对于我们全面深刻地理解这场旷日持久的争论,具有十分重要的参考作用。对于研究金融管制、证券立法、公司治理的学者,对于制定金融证券政策的决策人士,对于证券业、企业界的市场从业者和研究者来说,本书所提供的资料也是十分难得的。

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