相关信息
编后记
作者简介
序二
第一篇 信息披露的早期研究
证券市场的公共管制*
一 政策的制定
二 对较早前管制的检验测试
三 市场效率的衡量标准
四 结论
附录
被要求的披露与股票市场:1934年证券交易法评估
一 1934年证券交易法的披露要求
二 披露的立法基础
三 欺诈和操纵
四 信息与投资者和投机者的理性决策
1.发布财务数据的信息——财务说明书与股票价格
2.财务数据资深用户的回报
五 1934年法案对纽约股票交易所证券影响的实证分析
六 股东的损失
七 投资者对市场的信心——风险与公平
八 总结与结论
信息的私有价值、社会价值和发明活动的激励
一 预知与发现的比较
二 预知经济学要素
三 纯交换经济中预知的价值
四 预知的价值:生产与交换
五 信息发布、公共信息和信念的同质性
六 发现信息的价值
七 专利政策的含义
八 总结
金融市场中的披露管制:现代金融理论与信号传递理论的意义
一 引言
二 完美信息的世界
三 市场与信息
四 激励—信号传递分析
评价披露要求
收益
成本
附录——选择性披露政策模型
1.市场拥有完美信息,即信息是公共的
2.没有披露,内部交易没有向市场传递信息
没有内部交易
允许内部交易
3.没有披露法规,内部交易传送信息
4.没有披露法规,但知道内部人的存在
5.公司环境中的激励—信号传递方法
第二篇 强制披露与自愿披露
强制披露与投资者保护
一 联邦政府对欺诈的禁止
1.无法律干预的市场
2.反欺诈法规的影响
3.为什么反欺诈法规是国家的?
二 强制披露
1.披露与信息的公共物品属性
2.披露的利己主义模型的局限性
3.创造最优披露的私有或竞争方法
1)信息中介
2)知情交易者
3)股票交易所
4)州
4.强制披露的一些微弱支持的理由
1)增加市场的公众信心
2)保护未成熟的投资者
3)增加真实信息的供给
三 针对第三方影响的披露法规、法律错误与寻租行为
1.披露要求的目标
1)控制第三方影响
2)控制州间剥夺(exploitation)
3)控制普通法过程的成本
2.有效强制披露的轮廓
3.强制披露要求的结构
1)标准化的、惯例化的披露
2)跨州公司披露但州内公司不披露
3)注重历史事实
4)禁止其他事实的披露或者已披露事实的口头“变化”
5)事前评估与安全港
6)严格使用重大遗漏检验
四 关于成本与收益的证据
1.直接成本
2.间接成本:活跃水平的影响
3.收益:投资者的利润
4.收益:中介机构与公司的利润与损失
五 结论
市场失灵与强制披露制度的经济分析
一 从公共物品的视角
1.市场失灵:证券研究不足的一个原因
2.社会资源的浪费与过度研究的问题
3.配置数据:充足证券研究的社会利益研究
二 自愿披露的理论
1.对理论的批评
2.实证比较
三 向投资者的披露:有效市场中投资者导向的披露机制
1.披露作为一种多元化投资的有效手段
2.风险评估与组合投资修正
四 结论
民事责任和强制信息披露
一 民事责任体系的适当目标
(一)信息披露的社会收益
1.信息披露对投资者保护并不重要
2.信息披露在选择新投资项目和改进现有项目运营中的作用
(1)立法机制
(2)市场机制
3.信息披露在增加二级市场的流动性中的作用
4.结论
(二)避免融资来源扭曲
二 建议的民事责任体系
(一)控制信息披露程序的实质性规则
1.时间的顺序
2.投资银行的认证
(二)发行人的责任
1.不发行证券时违背信息披露规则
2.公开发行证券时所产生的信息披露违规
(三)其他行为者的责任
1.让非发行人的参与者承担责任的目的
2.对“整体责任”有贡献义务的非发行人的行为者的责任
3.赔偿金与发行人年总投资成比例的理论基础
4.恢复的程序
(四)打击性诉讼的潜力
三 目前关于责任的一般讨论
(一)规模和责任严格性的关系
(二)非发行方行为者的责任的标准
(三)私募发行(Private Placement)
四 结论
投资者成熟与自愿披露
一 背景和模型的引入
二 一种简单的公开定值竞拍
三 对均衡披露的分析
四 结论
附录
致谢
第三篇 披露政策的比较分析
强制披露与自愿披露:金融与实物外部性情形下的比较
一 存在金融外部性的模型描述
二 一个代表企业家与一个代表投资者的披露
引论
三 存在金融外部性的披露政策
四 存在实物外部性时的披露政策
五 结论
强制披露与自愿披露的比较
一 引言
二 基本模型
三 两种质量类型和外生的知情顾客数量
1.自愿披露均衡
2.均衡精炼
3.知情顾客数量外生时的强制披露
四 是否知情的决策
1.产品价值与知情利益
2.自愿披露的均衡
3.知情顾客数量内生时的强制披露
五 总结
附录
披露法律与收购报价*
一 披露是私人最优的
二 披露在收购报价中的作用
三 结论
强制披露的行为经济学分析*
一 关于强制披露的争论
1.基于公共物品的市场失灵观点
2.基于外部性的市场失灵观点
3.基于信息不对称的市场失灵观点
二 思想实验
1.羊群行为
2.习惯与传统
3.现状偏好
4.社会范式
三 从市场失灵到管制的思考
1.存在资本市场失灵的证据吗?
2.管制者能做得更好吗?
四 结论
强制披露与自愿披露:证券市场的信息问题(本书导读)
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